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DICKMAN AND CODE SECTION 7872: THE DEATH KNELL
TO INTEREST-FREE AND BELOW-MARKET LOANS
Until recently the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has been unsuc-
cessful in taxing interest-free and below-market rate interest loan benefits. A
taxpayer could circumvent the tax on the interest income from such attractive
loans. It was possible to shift loan proceeds to family members, employees, or
stockholders without incurring a tax liability on the exchange. Such a transac-
tion was particularly advantageous when the recipient was a child in a low tax
bracket. The child could invest the loan proceeds and be taxed at a low rate.'
In 1961 the Tax Court frustrated the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(Commissioner) in his attempt to tax the economic benefits of interest-free
loans made to controlling stockholders of a family owned corporation in Dean
v. Commissioner.2 Twenty years later the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
again sided with the taxpayer. In this case, Commissioner v. Greenspun, 3 the
taxpayer received a below-market rate loan with no tax burden because of
preferential treatment.
The Service was no more successful in collecting gift tax on interest-free
demand loans. Crown v. Commissioner4 was decided in the Seventh Circuit.
The court of appeals agreed that the taxpayer had not made a taxable gift of
the interest income when he loaned money to his children and relatives.'
This privileged tax status was turned upside down by the United States
Supreme Court and Congress in 1984. In that year the Supreme Court re-
versed the long accepted Crown theory in its Dickman v. Commissioner6 deci-
sion. The Court held that interest-free demand loans had gift tax conse-
quences.7 In the same year, Congress recognized the extent of the tax loophole
that these loans presented and created Internal Revenue Code Section 78728
with the enactment of Section 172(a) of the Tax Reform Act (1984 Tax Act).'
I. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS. FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 512 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as FREELANDI; Adams & Kerworthy, Tax Planning for the Family: New Rules for Interest
Free and Low Interest Family Loans, 56 OKLA. B.J. 761 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Adams]; Lieber, Interest-
Free Loans, 23 Duo. L. REV. 1019 (1985); McCue & Brosterhaus, Interest-Free and Below-Market Loans
After Dickman and The Tax Reform Act of 1984, 62 TAXES 1010 (1984) Ihereinafter cited as McCuel: Note,
Below-Market Intrafamily Loans - The Recognition of Unrealized Earnings and Accumulations of
Wealth: LR.C. Section 7872 and Dickman v. Commissioner, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 599 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Intrafamily Loans].
235 T.C. 1083 (1961).
1670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).
467 T.C. 1060 (1977), affd 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
lid. at 1065.
1104 S. Ct 1086, reh'gdenied. 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
1Id. at 1094-95.
I.R.C. § 7872 (1984).
'The Tax Reform Act is a section of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-369. § 172. 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 697 (98 Stat.) 494 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 7872).
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This Act imputed interest on tax-free and below-market loans.'
This comment will discuss the history of interest-free and below-market
rate loans, including recent changes in the law from Dickman and the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) revision in 1984. In addition, some of the tax planning
alternatives to interest-free loans will be briefly examined.
HISTORY
Federal Income Tax - The Dean Rule
The Dean v. Commissioner case was one of first impression for the Tax
Court." The interest-free loan income issue in Dean revolved around corporate
non-interest bearing loans to majority shareholders. The Commissioner's
premise was that the taxpayers should be taxed on the income attributable to
the free use of corporate funds. 3
Mr. and Mrs. Dean, controlling stockholders of Nemours Corporation,
obtained interest-free loans in excess of two million dollars from Nemours.4
The Service relied on several cases in which stockholders or officers derived
taxable income from rent-free personal use of corporate assets." Much to the
Service's dismay, the Tax Court held that the Dean circumstances presented
no taxable income 6 despite the broad scope of the definition of gross income in
Section 61 of the Code. 7 The Tax Court stated that the income would be offset
by an equal deduction under Code Section 16311 and, thus, the recognition of
the income benefit was unnecessary.1
In Dean, the dissent was quick to point out that the majority reasoning
l"Id.
"35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
111d. at 1087.
"The Commissioner determined that the tax deficiency, based on the prime rate, was $65,649 for 1955 and
$97,932 for 1956. Id. at 1087-89.
'Id. at 1088.
"Id. at 1089-90. See Dean v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d 1019 (19511: Rodgers Dairy Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 66
1950): Dean v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 256 (1947), afJfd 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951); Chandler v. Comm'r. 41
B.T.A. 165 (1940). affd. 119 F,2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941); Reynard Corp. v. Comm'r, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934);
Frueauff v. Comm'r. 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934).
"'35 T.C. at 1090.
'The Code defines gross income as -all income from whatever source derived..." lemphasis added). I.R.(C.
§ 61 f1955).
"[his Code section generally allows a deduction for "'interest paid or accrued." I.R.(. § 163 11955). One im-
portant exception to § 163 is for interest expense relating to tax-exempt obligations. This type of interest ex-
pense is not allowable as a deduction. I.R.C. § 265 (1954).
Dean was a landmark case for interest-free loan taxability. The theory that the income and deductions
would offset each other is now known as the Dean rule. IRS Letter Ruling (C(H) 8309002 lNov. 2, 1982).
'"35 T.(. at 1090.
Interest bearing promissory notes do not require that the taxpayer report taxable income on the accrued
interest unless, and until, the taxpayer has a right to receive a fixed amount of interest. Society Brand
Clothes. Inc. v. ('ommr, 18 T.('. 304. 321 11952). 2
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made "too broad a generalization."2 The dissent specified that an interest ex-
pense deduction would not be available if the loan proceeds were used to invest
in tax-exempt indebtedness.2t Several commentators have since agreed that the
two-transaction approach should have been used by the Dean court, reporting
both income and an allowable deduction.22 The taxpayer might not even be
able to use his interest expense deduction if he did not itemize deductions.23 It
seems only rational that a taxpayer who receives an interest-free corporate
loan should have the same tax liability as a shareholder who receives a
dividend24 or an employee who receives compensation and then pays interest
on a separate obligation.25
Regardless of the rationality of the decision, the Service followed the
Dean rule without question for 12 years. Then, in 1973, the Commissioner
suddenly announced that he would not acquiesce to the Dean decision.26
Thereafter, the Service started an unsuccessful campaign to convince the Tax
Court to tax interest-free and low-market rate loan benefits.
Reaffirmation of the Dean Rule
In each subsequent case the Commissioner presented, the Tax Court
refused to overrule Dean. Instead, it repeatedly ruled for the taxpayer, thus
allowing stockholders to reap tax-free benefits from such loans.? The Tax
- 35 T.C. 1091 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
'"Id. at 1092 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
2
-Hartigan, From Dean and Crown to the Tax ReJorm Act o] 1984: Taxation o1 Interest -Free Loans. 60J
Noi Ri DAMt L. Ri-v 31, 42-49119841: Keller, The Tax Consequences ojlnterest-Free Loans from Corpora-
tions to Shareholders and from Employers to Employees. 19 B.(.L. Rt-v 231. 235-55 11978): O'Hare, The
Taxation o] Interest-Free Loans. 27 VAND. L. R-v. 1085 11974).
If the corporation had noearnings and profits, I.R.C. §§ 301Ic)2, 316 (1984) provide that the distribution
is a return of capital on which the shareholder will have no taxable income. The taxpayer would still have an
interest deduction as with any loan.
An interest-free loan should have the same effect on a stockholder as if the corporation pays a dividend
and the recipient then pays interest on a separate obligation. [here are flaws in the assumption that interest-
free loans are automatically offset by deductible expenses. The receipt of income is the first step transaction
and the expense deduction the second. Often these steps will offset each other but it is a fallacy to assume
that these transactions always balance out and cause no tax consequences. Several situations exemplify
cases in which income and deductions do not balance. Dividends are taxable income to the stockholder
under I.RAC. § 61)a))7) but not a corporate tax deductible expense under I.R.C. §§ 3011c11). 316 11984).
Some itemized deductions might decrease because of a percentage of adjusted gross income limitation.
Some examples of such deductions are casualty losses under I.R.C. § 165 (1984). charitable contributions
under IR.C. § 170 (1984) and medical expenses under IR.C. § 213 )1984). The taxpayer might not even be
able to use his interest expense deduction. I.R.C. § 63 11984 allows a taxpayer to itemize deductions only if
they exceed a specific amount. Id.
21The taxpayer only receives a tax advantage from itemized deductions that exceed the excess of itemized
deductions over the zero bracket amount. Therefore, in the case of interest expense. the expense might not
result in a deductible expense if the total of all deductions do not exceed the zero bracket amount. I.R.C. §
63(cl (1984).
24I.R.C. §§ 3011c)(1), 316 11984). See also Hartigan, supra note 22: Keller. supra note 22: O'Hare. supra note
22.
2
.R.'. § 6 la)(1) (l1984) includes compensation as an iten of gross income. I.R.U. § 1631a) 119841 generally
allows deduction for interest payments on indebtedness.
-1973-2 C.B. 4 (1973).
"A line of cases followed in which the Service unsuccessfully demanded taxation of loan benefits to
Spring, 19861 C()MMt:NT5
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Court did begin to acknowledge the disparities present in the Dean doctrine,
but the courts were unwilling to overturn a rule that had been followed for so
many years." The only requirement seemed to be that the parties execute a for-
mal loan instrument with an intent to repay the principal." The form seems to
take precedence over the substance of the transaction.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals strongly declined to overrule the Tax
Court's Dean position in 1984 with Commissioner v. Greenspun.11 The ap-
pellate court stated that "Iwihere... the Government seeks to modify a princi-
ple of taxation so firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, it should turn to
Congress, not to the courts." 3'
Mr. Greenspun received a four million dollar below-market interest loan
from Howard Hughes. 2 The Commissioner assessed a tax deficiency based on
the present value of the interest that the taxpayer would have paid in an arm's
length transaction less the interest specified in the actual term loan contract."
The Tax Court agreed that the loan was compensation in exchange for indirect
control of Mr. Greenspun's newspaper and favorable publicity for the Hughes
operation." Nevertheless, the Court relied upon the Dean rationale and found
no taxable benefits to Mr. Greenspun from the loan. 5 While the opinion ad-
mitted that the income would not offset the deduction in every case, it was
enough that the interest deduction in the present case would offset the
economic benefit. 6
The following year an appeals court extended the Dean rule to the limit
and perhaps beyond." This time an appeals court was reviewing a United
stockholders. Baker v. Comm'r. 75 T.C. 166 11980), aJJ'd. 677 F.2d II (2d Cir. 1982): (reel v. Comm'r, 72
T.C. 1173 1979), af-d649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981): Zager v. (omm'r, 72 T.C. 10091979), affdsub nom.
Martin v. Comm'r, 649 F.2d 1133 )5th Cir. 1981): Trowbridge v. Comm'r, 50T.C.M. IP-H) 81,190(1981):
Beaton v. Comm'r, 49T.C.M. IP-H) 80,413 1980), aJfd 664 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir. 1981): Parks v. Comm'r,
49 T..M. (P-H) 1 80,382 (1980), affd. 686 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Estate of Liechtung v. Comm'r. 49
T.C.M. )P-H) 180,352 (1980): Martin v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,469 (1979).afjfd, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th
(ir. 1981): Suttle v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. )P-H) 178,39311978): Lisle v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M, JP-H) 1 76,140
11976).
2
:Greenspun v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 931, 950 11979). affd. 670 F.2d 123 19th Cir. 1982).
Had the Service pressed its position earlier, the courts might have been willing to overturn Dean.
However, Dean was the rule for so long that deviation by the courts would only now cause uncertainty for
taxpayers. Greenspun v. Comm'r, 670 F.2d 123, 126 19th Cir. 1982): Martin. 649 F.2d at 1133. See also
Hartigan, supra note 22.
'"Parfrey v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. IP-H) 83,756 (1983). The most important criteria distinguishing a cor-
porate loan from a corporate dividend seems to be the intent to repay the loan. Although the existence of a
loan can be proved without a formal agreement, a written note provides strong evidence of the intention of a
bona fide loan. 7 MERTENS. THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXAtII)N § 38B. 19 (1985).
-'670 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1982).
'Id.
"Id. at 124.
"The Service asserted a deficiency of $469,614 for 1967 and $1.157.956 for 1969. Id.
"d. at 124-25.
"(. at 125-26.
"Id. a[ 125.
'*See Doti and (ox. Interest-Free Loans and the Impact of Hardee v. United States. 10 W. Si. UL. R v. 187
119831.
[Vol. 19:4
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States Claims Court decision instead of a Tax Court judgment." At the trial
level, in Hardee v. United States, the United States Claims Court declined to
follow Dean."
In Hardee a closely-held corporation had made interest-free demand loans
to controlling stockholders. The loan principal fluctuated between $595,000
and $474,000.0 Concurrently, the stockholders, Mr. and Mrs. Hardee, held
over $500,000 in tax-exempt municipal bonds.4' The United States Claims
Court ruled that the foregone interest constituted taxable gain to the
Hardees.'2
Even the Dean Court had not gone as far as this appellate court reversal.
The Dean rationale relied on the fact that the borrower's implied interest
payments would have been fully deductible. 3 By contrast, the Hardees would
not have had an interest deduction because the loan proceeds were presumably
used to purchase tax-free bonds."
Nevertheless, the appeals court refused to oppose twenty years of case
law, leaving any change up to Congress. 5 The appeal ruling stated that
interest-free loan benefits were not taxable regardless of the loan purpose."
After almost seventy years, fifty years of government inaction and twenty
years of case law precedent,' businessmen had come to rely on the nontaxabili-
ty of interest-free and below-market loans. 8 Change would soon come from
Congress, not the courts.
Gift Tax - Crown Loans
In the meantime the Service had attempted to attack interest-free loans on
a different front. In 1973 Revenue Ruling 73-611 proposed a gift tax for the
present value of the foregone interest on family-related, interest-free loans. The
Service based its position on the undisputed fact that the notes were not worth
face value at redemption." The donor would receive interest plus return of
"Hardee v. United States, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
-Id. at 662.
1'1d. at 663.
"Id. at 663-64.
21d. at 662.
"Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090.
"See Doti and Cox, supra note 37.
Expenses that relate to tax-exempt income are not tax deductible. I.R.(. § 265 (1973).
"Hardee. 708 F.2d at 664. See Martin. 649 F.2d at 1133: Hartigan. supra note 22.
"Hardee. 708 F.2d at 664.
"Id. at 668.
"Id.
"Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
501d.
Spring, 19861 (')NIMI.N IS
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principal in an arm's length transaction and, therefore, should be taxed on the
transfer of "the value of the right to use money."'" The Service stated the value
should be determined by an accepted rate of return as found in the Internal
Revenue Code Regulations (Regulations).52
A year later the Service sent a deficiency notice to Lester Crown for delin-
quent gift taxes. 3 The gift tax was based on foregone interest from interest-free
demand and open account loans to trusts for the benefit of the taxpayer's
children and close relatives.5"
The Tax Court heard the Crown case in 1977.55 This was the Tax Court's
initial hearing of this issue. 56 Chief Judge Dawson's opinion voiced the Tax
Court's opposition to obligating a taxpayer to make a profit on his
investment ."
The Tax Court relied heavily on a federal court case, Johnson v. United
States. 8 Johnson had held that the foregone interest on demand interest-free
loans from parents to their children was not a taxable gift." The Johnson opin-
ion noted that "[tihe time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal
at arm's length with his children."6
The Crown dissent stated that the majority had disregarded gift tax
statutes and legislative history.6 The committee reports concerning the gift tax
Code sections indicate the law was meant to be comprehensive and to include
all transfers of property or property rights that were donated to another.62
Code § 25 12(b)63 states that a gift occurs when "property is transferred for less
51Id.
521d. The ruling leaves uncertainty in determining the gift portion of the loan. O'Hare, supra note 22, at
1088-89.
The Regulations give rules for present value determinations of annuities, life estates, terms of years, re-
mainders, and reversions. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1973).
53Crown v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 1060-61 (1977).
-"The loans were through a partnership in which the taxpayer was a 1/3 partner. By December, 1967, the
loans totaled over $18 million. The Service computed the interest based on a 6% rate on the daily outstand-
ing balance as if the loans were arm's length transactions. Mr. Crown's share of 1967 alleged deficiency was
$46,000 in federal gift tax. Id.
"Id. at 1060.
d. at 1062.
51id. at 1063-64.
11254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
"Id. at 77.
wid.
"Crown, 67 T.C. at 1066 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
"id. The type of devise used to directly or indirectly transfer a gift was not important. The substance of the
transfer should rule. "The terms 'property,' 'transfer,' 'gift,' and 'indirectly' are used in the broadest and most
comprehensive sense;..." H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 27-28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B.
457,476 (hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 708); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (19321, reprintedin
1939-1 C.B. 496, 524 (hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 665).
SI.R.C. § 2512(b) (1984).
[Vol. 19:4
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than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
while § 2511" gives a wide encompassing definition for a gift transfer.
Regardless of the dissent reasoning, the Crown demand loan became an
easy way to shift high bracket parental income to a child's lower bracket rate.""
It seems all that was needed was good record-keeping and an intent to repay
the loan principal.6'
THE BEGINNING OF THE END - DWKMAN REPLACES CROWN
The Service was unsuccessful in obtaining judicial approval of gift tax
consequences for a non-interest bearing loan transfer until Dickman v'. Com-
missioner.68 Dickman brought an end to Crown loans as a tax planning tool.""
The Tax Court originally determined that Mr. and Mrs. Dickman did not
owe gift tax on the use of the money loaned without interest to the Dickmans'
son and their corporation.' 0 For the first time a court of appeals took the posi-
tion that such loan benefits were taxable for gift tax purposes." The U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to resolve the Crown versus Dickman
conflict.'2
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate reversal.'I The Court relied on
the broad intent of the gift tax statutes and the original committee reports
when those statutes were first proposed.'4 Those were the same authorities re-
ferred to in the Crown dissent seven years before.' The Dickman decision ac-
knowledged the value received from use of the loan proceeds, as well as the in-
come shifting benefits to the lender.76 It seems that, finally, the judiciary was
ready to accept the economic realities of interest-free loan transfers and
benefits.
With the Dickman "common sense approach" to interest-free loan taxa-
Old.
11I.R.C. § 251 ](a) (1984) in relevant part: "the tax imposed .. shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or m-
tangible;..."
"Avery, The Lester Crown Case: Its Implications and Applications. 38 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAXVN § 36, §
36.04)3) (1980); Comment, Dickman v. Commissioner: Turning Crown on Its Head. 37 TAx LAw. No. I,
223 (1983) Ihereinafter cited as Comment, Turning Crown on Its Headl.
"Avery, supra note 66, at § 36.04(2).
1104 S. Ct. 1086, rehg denied 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
- Avery, supra note 66; Comment, Turning Crown on Its Head. supra note 66.
lThe aggregate loan balances reached sums of nearly S700,000 during a five year period. 104 S. Ct. at 1089.
71Id.
'lid. at 1088.
"Id. at 1089.
"Id. at 1089-90. See H.R. Rep. No. 708, supra note 62; S. Rep. No. 665, supra note 62.
"Crown. 67 T.C. at 1066 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
'Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1090-91.
C()MIN ISSpring, 19861
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tion," the economic benefits of demand interest-free and low-market rate term
loans lost some of their glamour."
CONGRESS REACTS
Congress closed the door on the rest of the interest-free and below-market
rate loan tax advantages with the 1984 Tax Act. This resulted in the rather
confusing Code § 7872.'9 It appears that the Dickman decision encouraged
Congress to act at last."'
The House Ways and Means Committee report observed that taxpayers
were using interest-free loans to avoid taxes.' Section 7872 was the Service's
long awaited answer to the repeated request for an all-inclusive tax on interest-
free and below-market loans." Congress was now ready to reclassify these
loans as arm's length transactions. " With § 7872 Congress created the fiction
that the foregone interest benefits are transferred from the lender to the bor-
rower and then paid back as interest by the borrower to the lender."
The section applies to gift loans, compensation-related loans, corporation-
shareholder loans, tax avoidance loans and other below-market loans that
would significantly affect the lender or borrower's federal tax liability." Cer-
tain loans to qualified continuing care facilities are also affected. "6
It is evident that the inclusion of tax avoidance loans and those that
significantly affect the taxpayers tax liability are vague enough terms to allow
the Treasury broad interpretation. The Proposed Regulations to § 7872 (Pro-
posed Regulations)"7 reinforce this view. The Proposed Regulations broadly
define "loan" in order to "implement the anti-abuse intent of the statute,"'88 but
bona fide prepayments for services, property or property use are not con-
Note. Dickman v. Commissioner: The Supreme Court Applies the Git Fax to Interest-Free Loans. 35
AlA. L. Riwv. 553 1984).
'lhe reasoning inherent in the gift tax laws discourages income shifting. It seemed only logical that (on-
gress would eventually give in to the Service's persistent attacks on the noniaxability of interest-free loans.
Mandelman & Heber. Interest-Free Loans: The Gi and Estate Tax Planners Dream - Are We About to
he A wakened?. 65 MARQ. L. Riv. 367, 369, 387 119821.
Dickman did not completely eliminate gift loans. Taxpayers could still transfer large sums to low bracket
taxpayers, thus, shifting the taxable income. The gift tax would have to be paid at the time of the transfer.
but the annual gift tax exclusion allowable under I.R.(. § 25031h) of $10,000 could be applied. Note,
Dickman v. Commissioner: Gift of Interest- Free Loans, ARK. L. RiV. 4(10, 411 11982).
;"I.RC. § 7872 119841.
'FRE|.ItANt). supra note 1, at 513.
" H.R. No. 98-432, 1373-74, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE (ONG;. & AD. N-ws 1021.
"
2Adams, supra note I at 761.
11I.R.C. § 78721a1)1) 11984); Lieber, supra note I at 1019.
"Adams & Kenworthy, supra note I.
"I.R.C. § 78721c)11)1 19841.
- ld.
"Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872 11985).
"Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-21a)1l (1985).
{Vol. 19:4
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sidered loans.8"
EXCEPTIONS
Section 7872 and the Proposed Regulations do have some exceptions. De
minimus gift, compensation-related or corporate-shareholder loans without a
tax avoidance purpose are exempt from the statute for any day the aggregate
amount of loans between the parties does not exceed $10,000.1' This exemp-
tion loses much of its usefulness when, in the case of gift loans, the de minimus
exception only applies to proceeds that are not used to acquire income-
producing assets."'
Another exception is for loans of $100,000 or less between individuals.
The exception limits income tax on imputed income equal to the borrower's
net investment interest income. 2 Loans subject to § 483 "interest on certain
deferred payments on the sale or exchange of property""3 or § 1274 "deter-
mination of issue price in the case of certain debt instruments issued for prop-
erty"" are also not taxable under § 7872.'- Neither are loans taxable if they are
from a qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan.",
The Proposed Regulations specifically list several other exempted loans.
These exempted loans include: 1) loans to the general public in the ordinary
course of business, 2) bank, savings and loan or credit union interest accounts,
3) publicly traded debt obligations acquired at market price, 4) life insurance
loans to a policyholder, 5) government subsidized loans, 6) certain employee
relocation loans, 7) tax-exempt obligations, 8) United States government
obligations, 9) certain loans to or from a foreign person, 10) private charitable
foundation loans up to ten thousand dollars, 1 I) loans the Commissioner may
describe in revenue rulings or procedures, and 12) loans with no significant ef-
fect on federal tax liability. 7 The last exception gives the Secretary of the
Treasury broad interpretive latitude. 8
1d.
"IR.C. § 7872iC)02), (3) (1984).
"'I.R.C. § 7872(c(2)1 B (1984).
"I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1) (1984). This income tax exception does not exempt the lender from gift tax conse-
quences. Investment income is attributed to "gross income from interest, dividends, rents, and royalties" and
"net short-term capital gain attributable to the disposition of property held for investment." I.R.C. §
163(b)13)(B) (1984).
Under Section 7872 investment income of $1,000 or less is treated as if the taxpayer received no invest-
ment income. I.R.C. § 7872(d)lI)E))ii 1(1984).
"I.R.C. § 483 11984).
'I.R.('. § 1274 (1984).
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2)a)(2))ii) (1985).
'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c)(iii) (1985). Although pension, profit-sharing and stock bonus loans are not
subject to Section 7872, the taxpayer must remember that such loans are subject to limitations and rules
under I.R.C. § 72 (1984).
'Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T~b) (19851.
"McCue supra note 1. at 1017.
CON)M~i'N IS
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Demand versus Term Loans
Demand and term loans are treated differently under § 7872. A demand
loan is one which is payable on the lender's demand while a term loan agree-
ment states an 'ascertainable time for payment. Acceleration clauses are
disregarded in distinguishing a loan as demand or term."
Both type of loans are below-market if the interest is below the ap-
propriate applicable federal rate (AFR).'0 ' A below-market or interest-free de-
mand loan is taxable if the interest rate is lower than the AFR.0 2 A term loan
is subject to § 7872, using the appropriate AFR, if the present value of all
payments is less than the amount loaned.'"3 In both cases, the tax is based on
the difference between an AFR interest amount and the rate actually charged
for the loan.
In practice the demand and term loan taxation results are quite different.
The timing of the transfer tax events depends on the type of loan. The demand
loan computation is made at the end of each calendar year over the life of the
loan for both gift and income tax purposes."' The lender pays the tax for the
gift transfer yearly, as well as on the imputed interest income.' 5 If an interest
expense is deductible for the borrower, the deduction is also available yearly. "
The computation for term loan transfers is generally made at the inception of
the loan. The entire present value of the loan benefits is deemed given and
received at this one time. 07
In addition, term loans, other than gift loans, are subject to original issue
discount treatment on an amount equal to the excess of the loan proceeds over
the present value of the total payments under the contract.' t Accordingly, the
"Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10 11985t.
11.1d.
"'I.R.C. § 78721f)(21(1984).
The applicable federal rate for term loans is the federal statutory rate effective on the day that the loan is
made. This rate is under I.R.C. § 1274d) (1984) and is compounded semiannually. I.R.C. § 78721f)12))A)
(I 1984).
The Secretary of the Treasury determines the applicable federal rate each year to be applied on January I
and July I. IR.C. § 1274)d)11 119841. Loans of three years or under have a rate based on the federal short-
term rate, over three years and up to nine years based on the federal mid-term rate, and over nine years on
the federal long-term rate. I.R.C. § 1274)dl)l(lA) 11984). The applicable federal rate for demand below-
market loans is the federal short-term rate under I.R.C. § 1274(d)) 1984). I.R.C. § 7872t)(2)IB) 119841: H.R.
Rep. No. 98-86 I, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE (ONG. & At). NEWS 1701-02 (hereinafter
cited as H.R. Rep. No. 98-861).
'
2 I.R.C. § 7872)ell I)HA) 119841.
'"'I.R.C. § 7872e)(l 11B) (1984). The computation method for finding the value of a term loan is explained in
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-14 )1985).
"I.R.C. § 78721aM11, (2111984): FREELAND. supra note I, at 516.
"lId.
"'Id.: I.R.C. § 163(a) 11984) (generally allows an interest deduction): I.R.C. § 63c) (1984) (limits itemizing of
deductions).
"'I.R.C. § 7872b)(I)11984).
'"I.R.C. § 7872)b)(2) 1984).
[V . 19:4
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lender receives and the borrower deducts the original issue discount imputed
interest income and expense annually in compliance with § 1272109 require-
ments.
Section 7872 rules are effective for term loans made after June 6, 1984,
and demand loans outstanding on that date." ' Demand loans that were repaid
or restructured by September 17, 1984, were not subject to the statute."'
Gift Loans
Gift loans have been used as a tax planning device ever since the revenue
acts were first passed."' It was not unusual for a high tax bracket parent to
loan money to a low bracket child and, thus, save tax dollars with the income
shift."' This type of family gift loan is no longer an attractive tax saver. With
Dickman the Supreme Court ruled that a gift loan is subject to gift tax." ' Sec-
tion 7872 quickly followed, not only codifying the gift tax requirement, but,
more importantly, imputing the foregone interest payments on interest-free
loans as if they were received by the lender and deductible as an expense by the
borrower."' In most cases this forced transaction puts the income back with
the high taxpayer and the deduction with the low bracket taxpayer. It defeats
the original purpose of a Crown type transfer. Obviously, the Supreme Court
and Congress have tolled the death knell for below-market rate gift loans."6
Furthermore, the law now looks to the substance of a loan transaction not
the form of the loan instrument." 7 A loan from a parent to a child's corpora-
tion would be restructured as a gift loan from the parent to the child and
another loan from the child to the corporation."8
A gift or family loan is viewed as a demand loan for income tax purposes
regardless of the agreement terms." 9 Accordingly, the interest income and ex-
pense are acknowledged yearly on both gift demand and term loans. The gift
tax element of the foregone interest is still dependent upon the demand or term
nature of the loan.'20 Therefore, gift demand loans require annual gift tax pay-
'-"I.R.C. § 1272 (1984). Original issue discount is the redemption price over the issue price. I.R.C. § 1273
(1984). A discussion of original issue discount is beyond the scope of this article.
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-1(b)(1) (1985).
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-1(b)(2) (1985). The taxpayer was still liable for gift tax on gift loans prior to
those dates based on the retroactive nature of Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1086.
'McCue, supra note 1, at 101l.
"'FREELAND. supra note I; Adams, supra note I; Lieber, Loans. supra note I; McCue, supra note 1; Note,
Intrafamily Loans, supra note I.
"Dickman, 104 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
"IH.R. Rep. No. 98-861,.supra note 101,.at 1013.
"'McCue, supra note 1, at 1010.
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1) (1985).
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(g}(I(ii (1985).
"'1.R.C. § 7872(d)(2) (1984).
"I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1), (b)(1), (d)(2) (1984).
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ments on that year's foregone interest, but the gift taxes for term gift loans are
calculated as other term loans.21 As previously discussed, the present value of
all the benefits on term loans is considered to be received at the inception of the
loan so the first year gift tax on a term gift obligation covers all the loan
benefits.'22
COMPENSATION-RELATED LOANS
Another type of loan that has lost some of its usefulness is an employer-
employee low interest rate loan.'23 Section 7872 now treats the imputed interest
on these loans as compensation,"' deductible by the employer as expense2 5 and
taxable as income to the employee.' 2,
In the case of a demand compensation-related loan, it would seem on the
surface that the transactions balance each other. The employer has interest in-
come offset by wage expense, while the employee has wage income offset by
an interest deduction. It must be remembered, though, that wages are subject
to applicable Social Security2 ' and federal unemployment taxes. 28 Also, the
employee may not have enough deductions, even with the imputed interest, to
take advantage of itemizing deductions.' 21
In a term loan situation, all the wages are considered as paid at the incep-
tion of the loan. 3 ' Consequently, the employee pays income tax on the present
value computation of wages in the first year of the loan. Conversely, the
employer enjoys the full wage deduction in that first year.
All loans conditioned on future services are treated as demand loans.,3
When the services are performed or the condition lapses, the loan is treated as
if it had ended. A new demand or term loan is created using the appropriate
rules dependent upon the type of loan.'32
CORPORATION-SHAREHOLDER LOANS
A below-market loan between a corporation and a shareholder does not
121 id.
"'I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1), (d)2) (1984).
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c) 11985). Compensation-related loans also refer to loans in connection with
services between an independent contractor and a person to whom the contractor provides the service and,
also, partnership-partner loans based on services. I.R.C. § 7872(c((l1(B) (1984).
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c) (1985).
"'2I.R.C. § 1621a)(1) (1984) (salaries are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense).
"L. R.C. § 6 1 (all 1) (1984) (includes wages as gross income).
1'2.R.(. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (1984) (an employment tax with a portion paid by each the employee and
employer).
'-I.R.C. § 3301 11984) (an employment tax completely paid by the employer).
"'I.R.C. § 63 (1984).
''I.R.C. § 7872(b(1) (1984).
.Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-3(b)(5) (1985).
13'Id.
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have the same potential balancing results as a compensation-related loan. In a
corporation-shareholder loan, the corporation is deemed to have issued a divi-
dend to the stockholder.'33 Since a dividend payment is a non-deductible cor-
porate expense,' the corporation would receive imputed income for the in-
terest income without an offsetting expense.
The final tax consequences of a corporation-shareholder loan could be ex-
treme. If the loan were to the shareholder's child, the Service would use the
two-transaction approach. The loan would be recharacterized as two separate
loans." The shareholder would have to recognize dividends received and then
be deemed as having made a below-market gift loan to the child. The end result
would be a dividend payment without a recognized expense for the corpora-
tion, a gift tax liability and federal income tax due on the constructive interest
income for the stockholder, and a possible interest expense deduction for the
presumed low tax bracket child.
TAX PLANNING ALTERNATIVES AFTER DICKMAN AND § 7872
Although large interest-free and below-market loans are no longer viable
income shifting devices, some tax planning alternatives are available to tax-
payers. An outright gift is still a means to transfer income producing assets,'36
but, of course, once a gift is made the donor loses control of the asset and the
principal is never repaid.'37 As with a gift loan, the donor of a gift would be
liable for gift tax but, in the case of an outright gift, on the entire proceeds. 3
The advantage of an outright gift would be the elimination of yearly income
tax on the imputed interest income. 39
Instead, the donor could put the assets in an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of the donee."'" The grantor would still be liable for gift tax, but the
beneficiary would not have immediate control of the assets as in a direct gift.'
"Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(d)(1) (1985); See I.R.C. § 316(a) (1984) (dividends are generally distributed
from earnings and profits or as a return of capital).
131I.R.C. § 162(a) (1984) (limits deductible corporate expenses to those ordinary and necessary to carry on a
trade or business).
"'Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(g) (1985).
"'The donor of an inter vivos gift must have adequate mental capacity, intend to make a present gift, and
deliver the property to or on behalf of the donee. An inter vivos gift is irrevocable. RITCHIE. ALFORD & EF-
FLAND. DECEDENTS, ESTATES AND TRUsTS 752-53 (1982).
1'd. at 753.
MI.R.C. §§ 2501, 2503 (1984).
"'I.R.C. § 7872(a)(I), (2) (1984).
"'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1984) in relevant part:
Ordinary trusts... trust... refers to an arrangement ... whereby trustees take title to property for
the purpose of protecting or conserving it for the beneficiaries... an arrangement will be treated as a
trust.., if it can be shown that the purpose ... is to vest in trustees responsibility for protection and
conservation of property for beneficiaries who cannot share in the discharge of this responsibility..."
See also Johnson, Interestfree demand loans to trusts after Dickman and the DRA, 16 TAX ADVISER 66,
67-70 (Feb. 1985) (a discussion of various types of trusts).
'"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1984).
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However, the transfer of assets would be permanent just as in an outright gift.
There remains a way to temporarily transfer income producing assets
without imputing interest income to the donor. The donor can create a short-
term Clifford Trust for the benefit of the donee.'42 Gift tax is still a considera-
tion but only on the trust benefits as the principal reverts to the grantor.' The
main drawback of a Clifford Trust is the length of time that the transferred
assets must stay in the trust, at least ten years and one day.1' At that time the
principal could revert to the donor. A Clifford Trust is more complicated to
establish than a Crown type loan but will successfully shift asset income to a
low bracket taxpayer.
Recently, President Reagan has asked Congress to amend the tax laws so
that short-term revocable trust income would be taxed to the donor.4 If Con-
gress makes this tax change, Clifford Trusts will be significantly less popular as
tax planning tools.
If the donor is unwilling to tie up assets for over ten years, a spousal re-
mainder trust might be the answer. The term of years for a spousal remainder
trust is arbitrary and, therefore, can be substantially less than with a Clifford
Trust. 4 16 The assets are put in trust for the beneficiary with the donor's spouse
receiving the remainder at the termination of the trust.'47 The gift tax on the
potential trust earnings can be less than with a short-term trust since the term
of years can be shorter. '4 Because the remainder passes to a spouse, the donor
would not owe gift tax on the remainder portion of the transfer due to the
marital gift tax deduction.4 9 It is apparent that the stability of the donor's mar-
riage is a major factor in considering a spousal remainder trust.' It must be
remembered that the assets revert to the spouse and not the donor. The Presi-
dent would also like to see the income from spousal remainder trusts taxed to
"'Short-term trusts have been called Clifford Trusts after a taxpayer established an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of his wife with the principal returning to the husband upon termination. Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331, 332 (1940).
Clifford, the husband, did not avoid tax liability on the trust income, not because of the reversion he re-
tained, but, because the trust duration was too short and Clifford retained too much control. Id. at 335. See
Johnson, supra note 140, at 70; Rhine, Income Shifting under The President s Proposals. 124 TR. & EST. 16,
17 (Aug. 1985).
"' Johnson, supra note 140, at 70.
The gift tax on Clifford Trusts qualifies for the annual $10,000 exclusion available under I.R.C. § 2503(b)
1984). Id.
'"The grantor of a trust is taxable on the trust income if his reversion is within 10 years. I.R.C. § 673(a)
(1984).
"'Rhine, supra note 142, at 18.
"Smith, The Spousal Remainder Trust, 123 TR. & ET. 32 (Apr. 1984).
141Id.
148 Id.
"1Id.; I.R.C. § 2523(a) (1984) (allows a deduction from gift tax for the full amount of property donated to a
spouse).
"'Smith, supra note 146, at 34.
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the donor.'5 If Congress grants his request, these trusts also would lose most of
their tax planning usefulness.
CONCLUSION
For many years interest-free and low-interest loans were used as an in-
come shifting device to divert income from a high to a low tax bracket tax-
payer. The long history in interest-free and below-market rate loan use was
first challenged in 1961 in Dean. In that decision, the Tax Court held that such
a transfer was not a taxable event. Twelve years later the Commissioner an-
nounced nonacquiesence to the Dean principle and began a long series of un-
successful court challenges to Dean.
The Service's attack on gift loans, desiring gift tax on the use of the pro-
ceeds, was no more successful. The Crown decision again put the Tax Court's
stamp of approval on the interest-free family loans.
Thus, continued the Tax Court rationale until the United States Supreme
Court Dickman ruling in 1984. The Supreme Court reversed years of judicial
precedent and found the lender liable for gift tax on the loan benefits.
Congress was quick to act on the Court's lead in broadening the tax effect
of these below-market rate loans. The Internal Revenue Code Section 7872
codified The 1984 Tax Reform Act, making most interest-free and low-interest
loan benefits subject to federal income tax as well as gift tax.
Now that the Court and Congress have recognized the economic realities
of low or no interest loan transfers, tax planners must look to other methods of
income shifting to satisfy the Code.
Some present alternatives to interest-free transfers are outright gifts, ir-
revocable trusts, Clifford Trusts and spousal remainder trusts. These alter-
natives do shift income from a high to a low tax bracket individual, but
nothing can replace the prior complete nontaxable status of interest-free and
low-market obligations. In 1984 the Supreme Court and Congress closed the
loopholes inherent in such transfers.
BEVERLY MCDONEL
"'Rhine, supra note 142, at 18.
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